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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN ROOFING COMPANY AND/OR
EMPLOYER'S MUTUAL LIABILITY,
Peti tioners/Appellants,
vs.

:
:
:
:
:

GEORGE ROY GREEN, THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH AND THE SECOND
INJURY FUND,

:
:
:

Respondents.

:

Court of Appeals
Case No. 870189-CA

Category No. 6

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT GEORGE ROY GREEN

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to review final orders of the Utah State
Industrial Commission is granted to the Utah Court of Appeals
pursuant to §78-2a-3, Utah__Cqde_Ann.
DETERMIN1T1VE PROVISIONS
Section 35-1-75, Utah Codq^Arin., is dot ermi ni t i ve in
resolving the issue relating to an injured employee's rate of
compensation.

A copy of this provision is set forth in the

Addendum.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In September, 1985, George R. Green was an employee of
American Roofing Company.

He had been cmployorl for thr^o years

as a roof repairman. (R. 50)

Green was compcnscBted by American

Roofing at a wage rate of $15.47 an hour. (R. 34)

During the

14 weeks preceding his industrial accident, Green worked
approximately 13 hours each week. (R. 34)
At the time of the occurrence giving rise to his
claim for benefits, Green was suffering from advanced degeneration of his lumbar discs with large hypertrophic spurs.
247)

(R.

Green claims he sustained a compensable accident on

September 6, 1985.

Additionally, he claims that as a result of

this industrial accident, he is permanently and totally
disabled.
At approximately 1:00 p.m. on September 6, Green was
unloading debris which he had generated repairing roofs that
morning.

The debris, gravel, leaves and asphalt, was contained

in a five gallon bucket which was located in the center of the
bed of his pickup truck. (R. 22-24)

Green estimated the weight

of the filled bucket to be approximately 30 pounds.
Standing beside the pickup truck, Green leaned over
the side of the truck and lifted the bucket.

As he was remov-

ing the bucket from the truck, it snagged onto another bucket.
When this occurred, Green experienced "terrific pain" in his
lower back. (R. 24-25)

For a minute or two he was motionless,

hanging on to the side of the truck.
After the passage of several minutes, Green was able
to get into his car and drive home.

He did not complete his

job responsibilities that day, and he has been unable to return
to work. (R. 26-27)
George Green was admitted to Holy Cross Hospital on
September 25, 1986 for a lumbar myelogram and a CT scan.

After
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Following Mr. Green's evaluation by the medical
panel, Mr. Green was referred to the Utah State Division of
Rehabilitation Services.

Richard Olsen, a rehabilitative

counselor, rendered an opinion that in light of Mr. Green's
limited academic background, lack of transferable skills and
continuing medical problems, he was not a feasible candidate
for rehabilitation. (R. 255)
Based upon the record, Judge Martinez rendered his
findings of fact, conclusions of law and order finding George
Green to have sustained a compensable industrial accident,
thereby entitling him to a finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Section 35-1-67, Utah Code Ann.

These

findings were confirmed upon review by the Utah State
Industrial Commission.

A copy of Judge Martinez1 order, a

supplemental order and the order of the Utah State Industrial.
Commission are appended to appellants' brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMF.NT
The Utah Court of Appeals reviews decisions of the
Utah State Industrial Commission to insure that they are
reasonable and consistent with statutory provisions.
The Commission decision that George R. Green
sustained a compensable industrial accident falls within the
limits of reasonableness.
Green did not expect to sustain a disabling iniury
when he lifted a bucket of debris from his truck.
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Il llMI I I il h i t
igagt-d

•
Th^

'W»M I C P • r>* • <JV ,

.'[•!•. as

i pduQf * i ^ • '"n-nni; oc ,, *.~

^., - p f
(

t - iiiI i iii

person.
, impijLe :i Gi e e i :t" s
v w^ge,

i'A-

ARGUMENT

COMMISSIONS

INTII*I"ITATION
i A".nNA

a f !"

I 1 Ml .- '

a d m j •. i s i r <i5 i

nviPwriQ
cout t

11 i e i i

ion

Of

Administrative

S^ a i u t r-c-

[•-.

* f '

decisi-'H,-

^M .*-p.

Services

v.

E• i

r a t i v c aqr>n;
.v^n'-''-<-

i g i « E • e t. \ E? i g 1 11

Public

Service

Comn-.

^v.,->> - r .:

u)

u L a n nop i . o\
»:-J"

/•

*•'•

1983).

own r r ' T e r e n c o
1 r»<

•

for

p' • I w v
T

l

f

,

i

l

n

i

'

luMnnrni"
'

• *

a- ness

- ' '

urv/ornmor* ' a '

'

S

STATMT.

Mi*- a J n i M n s

a <:l i i 111 i :i := t i a • t j : • i i i s g .i

(Utah

ri

M*-

i - ~-

more e x t o n b . ; c c x p i i j e n c *
Construct

nr

»- r

norm
'

i n - a s u r e ^i ^
j

i '

; f ..t ~

if

nr

* -.UIPM^-

•' c

n.iasMfiab io -

s } ai

d

reasonableness
_L4i -JU

!i f i r

^ ^

:>•*{ ,

. <

* : . _ • - ' as

: v

and ra» i ^ n . i

•<-d.

n;i .:: t r ; a J Comm i s:

»^nv

1 QP"

-5-

POINT II
AN INTERNAL FAILURE OCCURS BY ACCIDENT
IF IT IS UNEXPECTED.
The Utah Supreme Court recently set guidelines to be
applied in determining whether an injury constitutes a compensable industrial accident.
P. 2d 15 (Utah 1986).

Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729

A two step procedure is applied.

First, the finder of fact must determine whether the injured
worker sustained an accident.

If so, a determination must then

occur whether a causal connection exists between the injury and
the worker's employment duties.
Appellants contend that the injury occurring to
George Green on September 6, 1985 did not occur by accident
and, further, if it had, a causal connection between the injury
and the worker's duties was not shown.
Mr. Green sustained an internal failure when he
lifted a bucket of debris in September of 1985.

If an ordinary

or usual exertion results in an unexpected injury, the injury
occurs by accident.

The critical inquiry is whether the exer-

tion causes an unplanned or unintended result.
accident" does not require an unusual event.

The term Mby

The basic and

indispensable ingredient of an accident is unexpectedness.
Allen v. Industrial Commission, supra.
Appellants contend that George Green had experienced
similar pain in his low back on occasions prior to the the

-6-

September 6, 1985 injury, and, therefore, the injury he sustained on that day was not an unexpected result from an exertion.

It is true that Mr. Green experienced back pain from

time to time prior to his disabling injury.

Mr. Green had been

employed by American Roofing for several years prior to his
injury.

During that time, he had repeatedly engaged in roof

repair work.

He experienced pain while performing the duties

of his job, but this pain subsided.

The more intense pain

experienced by George Green in September, 1985 did not subside.
It did not subside because the exertion on that day damaged his
lumbar spine.

The injury to his spine was sufficiently severe

to render him permanently disabled.

The record does not

support the conclusion that George Green expected to receive a
disabling injury when he lifted a bucket of debris from his
truck.

Rather, the record supports the Commission's conclusion

that Mr. Green had worked for several years repairing roofs and
that he believed he could continue to do so without experiencing a disabling injury to his lumbar spine.

The Commission's

conclusion that George Green sustained an injury by accident is
within the limits of reasonableness and rationality.
POINT II[
THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION REASONABLY
CONCLUDED THAT A CAUSAL CONNECTION EXISTS
BETWEEN THE INJURY AND GREEN'S DUTIES.
When George Green became employed w i I. h American
Roofing, he suffered from a bad back.

This preexisting back

condition subjects an injured worker to different causation

-7-

requirements than those imposed upon a worker without preexisting medical conditions.

The legal causation requirement

and medical causation requirement applicable to workers
suffering from preexisting conditions are
Allen decision.

set forth in the

Appellants do not contest that Green has

satisfied the medical causation test.

Under the medical

causation test, Green had the burden of showing that the
exertion of his occupation resulted in the disabLing injury.
The medical panel physician, Dr. Thomas Bauman, concluded that
the exertion required by Green's employment contributed to the
advanced degeneration of his lumbar discs.
Mr. Green's employer takes exception to the
Industrial Commission's conclusion that Green's employment
duties were the "legal" cause of his injury.
Mr. Green's employer does not take exception with
the legal principle that the aggravation of a preexisting
condition may constitute a compensable industrial accident.
Yet, under the legal causation requirement, a claimant with a
preexisting condition must show that his "employment contributed something substantial to increase the risk he already
faced in everyday life because of his condition."
at 25.

A_lJ enf su£ina

The legal causation requirement is designed to distin-

guish those risks encountered in everyday life from those risks
that are incident to one's employment.

An objective standard

is used when comparing a particular employee's exertion with
the usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life.

This was done to provide a more consistent and predictable
standard for the Utah State Industrial Commission.

Certain

exertions are believed to be typical exertions expected of men
and women in the latter part of the twentieth century, i.e.
"taking full garbage cans to the street, lifting and carrying
baggage for travel, changing a flat tire on an automobile,
lifting a small child to chest height, and climbing the stairs
in a building."

A_U_en, supra at 26.

In reviewing the conduct of the injured empLoyee,
the Industrial Commission reasoned that George Green was
injured while engaging in an exertion more substantial than
that engaged in by a typical twentieth century person.

The

Commission reasoned that weight alone is not the only criteria
to be used in applying the Allen legal causation.

The manner

in which the lifting is done "can significantly increase strain
on the body."

The Commission observed that "the applicant was

leaning over the side of the truck and pulling and lifting at
the same time . . . ."

The weight involved was significant and

as the injured employee lifted this weight with his arms
outstretched across the side of the truck, the bucket became
snagged on another bucket.

This placed additional strain on

Green's back, thereby resulting in a disabling injury.
The Commission acted within the limits of reasonableness and rationality in concluding that the manner in which
George Green attempted to lift a thirty pound bucket of debris
removed his conduct from that of the typical, twentieth century

-9-

person.

This conclusion should not be reversed.
POINT IV
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CORRECTLY COMPUTED
THE AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE OE THE INJURED EMPLOYEE.
The benefits provided to an injured employee who

sustains a disability are based upon his "average weekly wage."
The formulas to calculate the average weekly wage of disabled
employees are set forth in Section 35-1-75, Utah Code Ann.
Subsection 1 of Section 75 sets forth various methods to be
followed in determining an employee's average weekly wage
depending on whether the wages are fixed by the hour, day,
week, etc.

See Produce v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 657

P.2d 1354 (Utah 1983).

Part (e) of subsection 1 provides:

"If at the time of the injury the wages are fixed by
the hour, the average weekJy wage shall be
determined by multiplying the hourJy rate by the
number of hours the employee would have worked for
the week if the accident had not intervened. In no
case shall the hourly wage be multiplied by Jess
than twenty hours for the purpose of determining the
weekly wage. M
George Green was a part-time employee.
hourly at the rate of $.1.5.47 per hour.

He was paid

No party has taken

exception to the finding of the Administrative Law Judge that
at the time of the inrlustrial accident, Mr. Green worked 12 to
14 hours per week.
The statute at issue is not ambiguous.

It requires

that the hourly wage of an injured employee be multiplied by a
number not less than 20 for the purpose of determining "the

-i n-

employee's average weekly wage".

This yielded an average

weekly wage of $309.40.
In determining the benefit rate pursuant to Section
35-1-57, Utah_^!ode Ann.r Green's "average weekly wage" of
$309.40 was multiplied by 2/3, yielding a compensation rate of
$206.00.

Because the compensation rate exceeded Green's actual

wages of $201.11, a compensation rate in the amount of his
actual wages was applied. (No exception was taken to the
reduction of his compensation rate from $206 to $201.)
Mr. Green's employer objects to the decision of the
Industrial Commission awarding him benefits at a compensation
rate equal to his actual working wages at the time of his
injury.

The employer contends that such a ruling is unfair,

for it serves as a disincentive to Mr. Green to return to work,
and it gives preferential treatment to part-time employees who
are hired for less than 20 hours per week.
The Industrial Commission consistently construes
provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act in accordance with
its purpose to alleviate a hardship upon workers and their
families when disabling work related injuries occur.
Industrial Comm., 405 P.2d 613 (in ah 1965).

Baker v.

As a result of a

series of work related injuries, Mr. Green was found by the
Industrial Commission to be permanently and totally disabled.
The employer's concern that Mr. Green lacks sufficient incentive to return to work is unnecessary as the Commission has
rendered its opinion that Mr. Green is unemployable in light of

-11-

his physical impairment, his training, and his age.

The

employer has taken no exception to the finding of the Commission that Mr. Green is unemployable.
It is undisputed that workers experience tremendous
hardship when they sustain a disabling injury.

The intent of

the Worker's Compensation Act is to provide sustenance to an
injured employee and his family during the time of need.
Produce v. Industr ial Commission__of Utah , supra .

Consistent

with this purpose, a minimum compensation rate is established
for part-time employees.

The Commission assures all parties

concerned that no windfall will occur to an employee by setting
the maximum compensation rate at the actual wages earned by the
employee at the time of his injury.

Such a scheme is fair and

consistent with the intent of the statute.

It cannot be said

that the Commission's calculation of Green's compensation rate
is unreasonable in light of the clear directive set forth in
§35-1-75, Utah Code Ann.
Regarding the final argument of the appellant regarding reimbursement, Mr. Green expresses no opinion as this issue
concerns reimbursement of benefits paid to Mr. Green by the
Second Injury Fund, a matter that does not concern an injured
employee.
CQNCLU^J^N
George Green respectfully requests that this Court
affirm the decision of the Utah State Industrial Commission

awarding him lifetime benefits at a rate of $201 per week
DATED this

) <? day of November, 1987.
WINDER & HASLAM

By
W i l l i a m W. D o w n e p ^ J r .
A t t o r n e y f o r Rjz^pondent
G e o r g e R. G r e e n
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^DENJ3UM
35-1-75.

(1)

Average weekly wage - Basis of computation.

Except as otherwise provided in this act, the average

weekly wage of the injured employee at the time of the injury
shall be taken as the basis upon which to compute the weekly
compensation rate and shall be determined as follows:
(a)

If at the time of the injury the wages are

fixed by the year, the average weekly wage shall be that
yearly wage divided by 52.
(b)

If at the time of the injury the wages are

fixed by the month, the average weekly wage shall be that
monthly wage divided by 4 1/3.
(c)

If at the time of the injury the wages are

fixed by the week, that amount shall be the average
weekly wage.
(d)

If at the time of the injury the wages are

fixed by the date, the weekly wage shall be determined by
multiplying the daily wage by the number of days and
fractions of days in the week during which the employee
under a contract of hire was working at the time of the
accident, or would have worked if the accident had not
intervened.

In no case shall the daily wage be multi-

plied by Jess than three for the purpose of determining
the weekly wage.

-15-

(e)

If at the time of the injury the wages are fixed

by the hour, the average weekly wage shall be determined
by multiplying the hourly rate by the number of hours the
employee would have worked for the week if the accident
had not intervened.

In no case shall the hourly wage be

multiplied by less than 20 for the purpose of determining
the weekly wage.
(f)

If at the time of the injury the hourly wage has

not been fixed or cannot be ascertained, the wage for the
purpose of calculating compensation shall be the usual
wage for similar services where those services are
rendered by paid employees.
(g)(i)

If at the time of the injury the wages are

fixed by the output of the employee, the average weekly
wage shall be the wage most favorable to the employee
computed by dividing by thirteen the wages, not including
overtime or premium pay, of the employee earned through
that employer in the first, second, third, or forth period
of thirteen consecutive calendar weeks in the 52 weeks
immediately preceding the injury.
(ii)

If the employee has been employed by that

employer less than thirteen calendar weeks immediately preceding the injury, his average weekly wage
shall be computed as under Subsection (I)(g)(i),
presuming the wages, not including overtime or

premium pay, to be the amount he would have earned
had he been so employed for the full thirteen
calendar weeks immediately preceding the injury and
had worked, when work was available to other
employees, in a similar occupation,
(iii) If none of the methods in Subsection (1)
will fairly determine the average weekly wage in a
particular case, the Commission shal] use such other
method as will, based on the facts presented, fairly
determine the employee's average weekly wage.
(2) When the average weekly wage of the injured employee
at the time of the injury is determined as in this section
provided, it shall be taken as the basis upon which to compute
the weekly compensation rate.

After the weekly compensation

has been computed, it shall be rounded to the nearest dollar.
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